This research examines the factors that influence the adoption of new energy-saving technologies among U.S. manufacturing plants and explores their potential impact on aggregate energy efficiency. We conduct this analysis using two models: a conventional diffusion model and a stand-alone model of new technology adoption we develop in this paper. The latter model allows us to compute effects on aggregate efficiency based solely on adoption data.
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Introduction
With current technologies, emission of pollutants like greenhouse gases poses a difficult choice between potentially irreversible environmental damage and the burdens associated with potentially high cost mitigation policies. Yet, changes in technology could significantly alter these tradeoffs. It is argued that public policies affecting the development and spread of new technologies may, over the long term, be one of the most important tools for environmental protection.
But how can public policy encourage these activities? In the past, technology mandates have been used to deal with narrow environmental concerns within particular industries. However, the breadth of the GHG problem-over gases, industries, and time-defies such an approach. No one knows which technologies should be used in which industries, especially looking decades into the future. Instead, public policy must create incentives for individual plants to discover and adopt emission-reducing technologies by their own choosing. From these results we draw two important conclusions.
10% for the next fifty
Since we find that profitability has a significant effect on adoption, it will be important to consider the impact of public policy on fwm revenue. Policies that immediately raise prices without allowing fiims to anticipate those changes may lead to declining adoption rates if their financial health is adversely affected. Second and more significantly, these results put a damper on the idea that technology will save the day. Since energy efficiency improvement resulting from new technology adoption currently progress at only 1$ZO per year, even a large increase in this growth rate will take many years to translate into significant reductions in aggregate efficiency. The only possibilityy for significant technology effects is if public policy can encourage the development of large, nonincremental technologies.
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In the remainder of the paper, we present a brief overview of the existing literature and theory on technology diffhsion. We then develop an alternate model of technology adoption that establishes a link between plant-level adoption of energy-saving technologies and aggregate growth in energy efficiency. Sections 4 and 5 describe our data and results while Section 6 concludes. Additional data details are provided in an appendix.
Background
Research by economists on the subject of technology diffusion dates back more than four decades. The single most important conclusion of this work-well summarized in a recent article by Jaffe and Stavins ( 1994) -is that diffusion of new, economically superior technologies is a gradual rather than instantaneous process. 1 Specifically, diffusion is often portrayed as a classic s-shaped or sigmoid curve over time. That is, the rate of adoption begins slowly, speeds up, then eventually slows down again as market saturation approaches.
One justification for the sigmoid curve is based on an epidemic model of diffusion. Due to a lack of knowledge or confidence, the odds that a non-user will adopt a new technology increase with the growing popularit y of the technology. If we let represent the presence of the new technology at time tfor user i, we can write this relation as:
(1) +Xi,, =11xi,t_l = o) = 4C"X,.l xi,, 1SeeGriliches(1957), Mansfield(1968) , David(1966) , Davies(1979) , Oster(1982) , Levin,Levinet al. (1987) .
where~i,t.l is the average level of adoption-or popularity-and c is a constant.
P(AXi,t =11x,., = O) is the probability of a change in adoption status conditional on being a non-user in the previous period. Since the likelihood of being a non-user prior to time t is (1-~i,f-l) , the overall likelihood of a change in adoption status is
Note that the parameter c reflects the maximum probability or speed of adoption that is obtained when the fraction of users~i~_land non-users (1-~i,~_l) are both equal to 50%.
Following this intuition, it makes sense that the rate of adoption will be slow in the beginning (~i,,_l is small when there is little popularity) and in the end ( 1-~i,,.l is small when there are few non-users). In this model, the probabilityy of adopting the technology depends entirely on the number of other f~ms in the industry who have already adopted it.
The pioneering work of Griliches (1957) extends this model by establishing that the diffusion of new technology can be understood in an economic framework by allowing the rate of diffusion to be partly determined by the (expected) economic return to adoption. Mansfield (1968) then elaborates on this idea by considering the size of adopting f~ms, the perceived riskiness of the new technology, and the size of the required investment as potential determinants. According to this view of the world, the parameter c in Equation (2) will be a fi.mction of technology specific parameters, including size of potential users.
This idea of a technology-specific diffusion speed has been explored by many authors. The size of potential users has been argued to have both positive and negative
effects on adoption.2 Arguments for the former are based on the resources (financial, experience, expertise) associated with large firms, while arguments for the latter hinge on potentially oligopolistic market structure retarding the competitive pressures to innovate.
The possibility of varying diffusion rates for different technologies has been qualitatively described by Cohen and Levin (1989) as the difference between type "A" and "B"
innovations. 3 Type A innovations are minor and presumably diffise quickly while type B innovations are considerably more invasive and diffuse more slowly.
According to this line of thinking, economic factors influence the overall rate of diffusion based on idiosyncratic characteristics of the technology. Such factors do not, however, distinguish the rate of adoption by different jirnzs. A natural alternative proposed by David (1966) is to focus on inherent differences or heterogeneity among firms. Here, differences among potential adopters-not just knowledge or confidenceis the key factor that explains the gradual diffhsion process. In particular, these differences influence the value of the technology to individual fwms. Such differences might include the cost of equipment, cost of learning about a new technology, cost of adapting existing processes, or future benefits of the technology.
Specifically, one can imagine a threshold above which it pays to adopt the new technology and below which it does not. The threshold differs across firms and, over time, the cost of the innovation may fall and/or the quality may improve, thereby lowering the threshold. By regressing a firm's decision to adopt on variables that describe differences among fwms, one can empirically identify those differences which
affect a fwm's valuation of the innovation. There is evidence that many factors beyond traditional economic factors affect these valuations.4
There are numerous examples of environmental applications using both homogeneous and heterogeneous fwm models.5 Our approach to diffusion modeling includes elements of both: we estimate probit models of adoption using f~m-and plantlevel differences as determinants of the choice to adopt. However, we then convert our parameter estimates to correspond to effects on the speed parameter c in Equation (2 However, this diffusion model fails to explain changes in the long-term growth in energy efficiency. Suppose, for example, that technology #1 has just begun to diffuse through the economy. Technology #2 becomes available in five years and technology #3 after ten. All three have the capacity to raise efficiency by 10% once they are adopted by all plants. If each diffuses completely over five years, we would observe something like a 20% improvement after ten years. Yet, a policy that raises the diffusion speed and leads to complete adoption in only four years fails to change the long-term growth rate.
Assuming technology #2 still becomes available after five years and #3 after ten, the total 4SeeFazzari, Hubbardet al. (1988) , CalomirisandHubbard(1990 ),Carpenter, Fazzariet rd.(1994 , Cummins,Hassettet al. (1994 ),StoleandZwiebel(1996 ),andDeCanioandWatkins(1998 future periods for as long as energy prices remain 10% above their baseline, this increased growth will continue in the future.
In this pure adoption model, the relation (2) becomes inappropriate. We could imagine defining Xi,t as the total number of technologies adopted by plant i at time t so AXi,, represents the adoption of any new technology. But how could we construct the (1-Xi,,) term? We could write (N -Xi,t) where N is the total number of available technologies. However, our view is that N is enormous and-importantly-the possibility of running out of technology options is not a real concern.7
To explain the adoption of energy-saving technologies across time, we abandon the diffusion model. We retain the idea that heterogeneityy among plants influences adoption. However, instead of applying this idea to a model describing adoption of a single technology, we consider how heterogeneity influences adoption of any technology.
A model of energy efficiency
We seek a simple model where differences among plants can explain different levels of energy efficiency but where the aggregate level and variation is easy to summarize. We assume output is fixed and plants regularly compare the cost savings from adopting energy-saving technologies to the cost of adoption.8 In order to keep the relative distribution of energy efficiency constant, we assume that adoption costs fall as aggregate efficiency rises: if plants lag behind, there is an increasing incentive to "catchup" since adoption costs are lower. Based on these assumptions, we show that the w,'
. distribution of energy efficiency among plants converges to an ergodic distribution whose mean slowly rises over time.
We begin with a population of N plants each producing a given amount of output qn. Energy costs associated with production are the product of the output level, the energy use per unit of output and the price of energy c. = q. exp(-xfl )vw here c. is the total energy cost, x. is an energy efficiency index, exp(-x~) is the energy use per unit of output, and v. is the price of energy.
We assume that each period plants have the opportunity to invest in a discrete energy-saving project. The project raises their energy efficiency index by dunits and incurs a one-time cost of J. This increase in energy efficiency leads to a cost savings,
and a decision to invest if
Although the plant may have alternative energy saving opportunities, we assume that one opportunisty dominates and therefore the condition (4) does, in fact, determine the overall decision to invest or not.
In addition to the possibility of alternative activities, Equation (4) also ignores the dynamic aspect of investment. Cost savings occur not just today, but in all future periods. Further, cost savings in the future hinge on future decisions about energy efficiency. A better specification would be to invest if -'q~,,,vn,,, exp(-x~,,,) , the minimized, expected discounted {Xn..}l$>, .y>t value of all future energy costs-given current efficiency Xm,t and taking into account potential changes in output, energy prices and future efficiency. If P is quite small or if
is proportional to Ac, this specification reduces to (4). For this analysis, we assume one of these two cases holds.
With the gradual improvement in energy efficiency, energy costs decline over time. From (3), this leads to a decline in the cost savings-since there are less costs to save. In order for adoption to continue, it must be the case that the cost of these new technologies similarly declines over time. For that reason, we specify
where Z is the average energy efficiency in the population and j~is a plant-specific cost parameter. This parameter is potentially affected by the cost of financing the investment, (dis)economies of scale at the plant, management efficiency, etc. There is presumably an unpredictable, random component as well. The condition for adoption can now be
where, summarizing, x~measures the energy efficiency of the plant, 1 is the average efficiency in the industry, q. is the output level of the plant, Vtiis the energy price at the plant, c$is the discrete improvement is a plant-specific cost parameter.
in efficiency available at cost J = jn exp(-Z), and j.
11
-.
Equation (5) Finally, if the same adoption cost buys a bigger improvement in energy efficiency~this similarly raises the return and increases the likelihood of adoption.
In addition to those variables explicitly represented in Equation (5), there are many others subsumed in the plant-specific cost parameter j.. In particular, variables affecting the cost of financing investment, potential (dis)economies of scale, management efficiency, etc. Some of these form a predicable part. We assume the others follow a random disturbance. In particular, we summarize the entire right-hand side of Equation (5) with a simple model:
where z. is a vector of plant chm-acteristic including both factors directly appearing on the right-hand side of Equation (5) the function go summarizes their influence on the likelihood of adoption, and s describes the degree to which random factors influence the adoption decision. Based on this model, the likelihood of plant n to adopt is given by
Aggregate behavior
With plant level behavior given by Equation (7), we hope to show that aggregate behavior tends to a steady-state distribution of energy efficiency about an increasing level of aggregate efficiency. At this point, we assume that the size of the improvement in energy, d is fixed.9 Therefore, based on the aggregate vector of plant characteristics~, plant and aggregate energy efficiency, x. and Z, the fixed size of energy efficient improvements,~and the magnitude of random elements in adoption costs s, Equation (7) completely describes the evolution of energy efficiency.
In order to for a steady-state distribution of energy efficiency to exist, plant characteristics must remain constant. For example, if plant characteristics diverge over time, it would be natural for the distribution of energy efficiency to diverge over time as
well. Yet assuming plant characteristics are fixed is not particularly restrictive: if these characteristics instead change gradually over time, we simply recognize that the steadystate energy efficiency distribution will be gradually changing as well. With this assumption of time-invariance, we summariie the effect of plant characteristics on adoption by a parameter g. = g(zfi).
Writing the efficiency level of plant n at time t at x.,,, we can rewrite (7) as
ado''t=o[-x:-gn)
where 1$ is similarly the mean efficiency at time t. Letting F~be the cumulative distribution of g. + x at time t, we can easily compute the probability distribution at time t+l as:
That is, the probability that the sum of the plant parameter g. plus energy efficiency x is below a certain level at time t + 1,~+l(g~+ x), equals the probability it was below that level in the previous period,~(g. + x), minus the probability of being within 5 of f. + x and adopting a new technology.
An important observation is the role of the plant effect g. which, from Equation (6), summarizes the net cost of technology adoption. This effect shiils the distribution of a particular plant's likely energy efficiency relative to other plants. A particularly high value of g. indicates that the energy efficiency of that plant is likely to be lower. Why?
A high value of g. reflects a higher net cost of adoption. Over time, we would expect plants with higher net adoption costs to lag behind.
Recalling that our goal is to look consider long-run behavior, we note that the sequence of probability function defined by (8) where~(~) *() @~dF, y is just the aggregate probability of adoption and define or simplifying, 
Z=E,JJ (

XW* gn +x-x)]=~,fl[~(y+~-gn)d~"(y)]= @~*(y) +-= E[gn]
so that the mean of the distribution given by F* is the mean of the plant effects gfl. Equation (10) provides a recursion for determining the distribution of g. + x about the mean value of x over time. It is trivial to show that if A Xt+lis defined as in (9) then Ff+l given by (10) within the industry.
Implication of lower net adoption costs
A frequent goal of government policy is to lower the net costs of technology adoption (or innovation) in order to spur greater energy efficiency. From Equation ( per employee or per production worker), we find the standard deviation of log efficiency to be between 1 and 1.5. The implicationof thesenumbers,that someplantsuse 10or even 100timesas muchenergyas otherplants,seemsimplausible.
of results), growth in energy efficiency changes by a marginal amount, from 2.5% to 2.8% each period.
The parameters reflects the random variation in costs beyond the predictable deviations given by g.. Whens is small relative to the magnitude of gn, it means that adoption is determined by observable variables. For example, when~is 109o ands is only 5Y0,the average adoption rate is 370. On the other hand, whens is large compared to~, say E = 10% buts= 75Y0,the adoption rate is 4570. In the f~st case, g is determining adoption (or the lack of it) while in the second case g is relatively unimportant and adoption is random.
The consequence of a smalls is that plants will be relatively concentrated at the steady state. This is evident horn the upper right panel of Figure 1 . More importantly, smalls implies that shifts in~owing to aggregate policy intervention should have potentially enormous effects, perhaps moving adoption from rates near zero to rates near 100$ZO. Whens is large, such policies have less effect simply because random variation is more responsible for adoption than observable, and possibly manipulable, variables.
Determinants of adoption
Based on (6), there are two obvious plant characteristics influencing adoption:
energy prices (v.) and plant size (qn). Both plant size and energy price should have positive effects on adoption because both raise the energy bill and hence the potential savings from higher energy efficiency. 12 Equation (6) also shows that projects with larger efficiency improvements (~will also have a higher likelihood of adoption.
'2Any positive effects of plant size on adoption cost would counteract the positive effect on cost-savings. , .,
.
Other plant characteristics influence adoption by influencing the cost of the project j.. In this paper, we focus on financial characteristics of parent firms as potentially important determinants of project cost. The idea is simple: healthier firms will have more resources and easier access to credit than fwms that are less healthy. This lowers the cost of any investment project. Our empirical work focuses on two measures of health: working capital and net profits.
The only remaining parameter in (6) is the size of the innovation in terms of the improvement to energy efficiency, a which we assume to be constant. As noted earlier, there are also dynamic issues which we have subsumed into the cost parameter j.. These features might include other characteristics of the technology, its lifespan, flexibility, and maintenance requirements. They might also include other characteristics of the plant, such as capital stock vintage.
Summarizing, the explanatory model of the from's decision to make a discrete investment-specifically in energy efficient equipment-is a function of the equipment, plant and fwm characteristics listed below (only some of which we have access to): One of the novel aspects of this research is the focus on from-level investment decision making. Through the use of parent fiim identifying codes in the LRD we are able to link our existing plant-level data set with financial information from the parent firms, available since 1983 in the Quarterly Financial Report (QFR), based on the work of Long and Ravenscraft (1993) . This information permits us to examine the theoretically defined roles of the parent firms' financial characteristics and corporate policies as factors influencing technology adoption decisions.
Estimation
We have discussed two alternative models of technology adoption: one which focuses on the adoption speed of individual technologies and another which focuses on overall adoption rates of arbitrary new technologies. In both cases, observable characteristics of the plants influence adoption. In this section we estimate those influences in both models and compare the results
Diffusion of individual technologies
Earlier discussions on technology diffusion established Equation (2) as a descriptive relation for the change in adoption status over time. This differential equation can be solved for the path of adoption over time to yield:
where tOis a constant of integration and represents the half-way point where one-half of the potential users have adopted the technology. Since our data consists of adoption data at two distinct points in time, 1991 and 1994, we can compute the parameter c, measuring the speed of diffusion. In particular, given P(O)= PO and p(l) = p,, we can compute (12) 4C = log(l/po -1)-log(l/p, -1)
If PO and pl are sufficiently close, this can be approximated using (1) with the rate of adoption among non-users, P(AXi,, = 11 Xi,t_l = O), divided by the fraction of potential users that have already adopted,~r.l. The left panel of Table 1 computes estimates of the diffusion speed c for each of the sixteen technologies-sector combinations available our data.
in Remarkably, the diffusion speed is essentially the same for almost all technologysector combinations. That is, with sixteen independent estimates of the diffusion speed, a chi-squared test of equality fails to reject at any level of significance. Given the 3-year interval in the model (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , the estimated value, c = 0.22, indicates that the middle half of the population adopts the technology in about 7 years. 13 Recall that the parameter c indicates the rate of adoptions per 3-year period halfway through the diffusion process, when the fraction of users and non-users are both 50%. Roughly one-quarter adopt before that seven-year period and another quarter adopt afterward.
Of course, our real interest is in how an array of explanatory variables influence the diffusion speed. We do this by estimating a probit models for the probability of adoption in 1994 among non-users in 1991 with each of the sixteen technology-sector x 3(years period) = 7years. To get the exact value, we evaluate the logit function.
'3'ote"at * f combinations.
of explanatory Normally, the probit estimation would then be used to compute the effect variables on the this conditional probability of adoption. We focus on the speed parameter instead on the conditional probability because the conditional probability of adoption (hazard rate) is sensitive to the initial popularity of the technology in the diffision model. Technologies such as computerized HVAC should have lower hazard rates, relative to computerized process controls, for example, because the initial popularity in 1991 is lower-this is exactly what we see in Table 1 Yet the speed parameter is relatively constant. This allows us to make comparisons across technologies and sectors. In particular, we can average our results across technologies/sectors in order to obtain more precise estimates. 14 The right panel of Table 1 presents the effects of selected independent variables on diffusion speed: working capital as a share of total assets (work cap), energy prices in $/13tU (en prices), the log of employment (employ), and after-tax profit as a share of total revenue (profk). We observe three instances where employment (e.g., plant size) has a statistically significant coefficient, two where energy prices are significant, and one where profit is significant. One of the two significant energy price coefilcients has a negative sign-the opposite of what one would expect. At the bottom of the table, we average the sixteen estimates two ways: weighting each estimate equally and weighting the observations in proportion to the inverse of their variance (e.g., the precision)
providing an average with the lowest possible variance. Only employment is significant when averaged across all estimates.
These results provide no convincing evidence that energy prices or fwm financial health influence diffusion speed. While one might expect the small sample size to hinder estimates for individual technologies in particular sectors, the averages at the bottom are no more convincing even though the sample size is effectively over six hundred observations (the sum of the sixteen individual sample sizes). Alternative models where 14This approach of making comparisons across potentially similar samples is the idea behind hierarc~kal models. See Chapter 5 of Gelman, Carlin et al. (1995) .
the data are directly pooled and where different versions of the right-hand side variables are included produce similar results.
Despite the statistical insignificance, we can still assess the potential policy relevance of the variables by considering the confidence interval. Suppose we take the largest coefficient value inside a standard 95% confidence interval for a energy prices.
This would be 0.005 + 2 x 0.011 = 0.027, based on the precision weighted averages. We then consider how much energy prices might be influenced by a policy change. For example, a 10% rise in energy prices might be the most anyone is willing to contemplate.
Using this-high-end estimate of the price coefficient, we would find that a 107o rise in energy prices would lead to a 0.027 XO.1OX5.56 = 0.015
effect on the diffusion speed.
Based on the average observed diffusion speed of 0.22, this represents an increase of 790. In other words, picking ,any point along the diffusion curve, adoption will be occuring 770 faster. For example, imagine two technologies are just beginning the diffusion process with users comprising only one percent of the population. One diffuses at a speed of 0.22, the other at 0.0235. On average, it will take 15.7 years for the remaining plants to adopt when the speed is 0.022; this time falls to 14.7 when the speed is 0.0235. Thus, a ten percent rise in prices might arguably lead plants to adopt a new technology a year earlier. 15 Except for employment, which is unlikely to be a true policy lever and has a slightly larger effect, the remaining variables have an even smaller effect.
's Note that our choice of starting points for this comparison, 1%, is somewhat arbitrary. Picking a later starting point lowers the difference in average adoption time. For example, if we start the two technologies at 50%, the higher diffusion speed lowers adoption time by only 4 months. e Z** Is this an important effect? At most, this is equivalent to moving up each user's adoption by a year. While this obviously leads to cost savings; this is not the kind of improvement that will bring forth previously unattainable goals in energy use. What we need to understand is how the overall adoption rate-comprising both diffixsion and innovation-will change.
Growth in energy efficiency
The alternate model of technology adoption we present focuses on the generic adoption of new technologies rather than the particular progress of a single one. The advantage of this model is that we are able to derive aggregate results from a behavioral model at the plant level. In particular, while diffusion model is cursed because it fails to explain the process by which new technologies arrive, our model of energy efficiency presumes a ever-present menu of technology options. The adoption process alone determines the pace of aggregate efficiency growth.
. In this model, technology adoption is assumed to entail a similar increase in efficiency regardless of the technology chosen. In a given period, a certain fraction of plants, weighing the costs and benefits of adoption, choose to adopt a new technology.
Changing the variables that influence the costs and benefits-price, financial health, plant size, etc.-presumably will influence the number of plants choosing to adopt.
Our data consists of a single three-year period over which we observe whether or not a sample of plants has chosen to adopt any new technologies. Within our sample, roughly half choose to adopt new technologies and half do not. Based on the observed cross-sectional variation in prices, size, profitability and working capital, we can estimate how those variables are likely to affect the overall adoption rate. Table 2 and Table 1 is that Table 2 estimates a probit model using the adoption of any technology as the dependent variable, rather than the adoption of a particular technology. This means that for each industry, we can estimate only a single model, compared to the estimates for each of four technologies in Table 1 . The other difference between the tables is that Table 2 presents the effect of each variable on the conditional probability of adoptionwhich was only the fwst step of the calculations in Table 1 in order to compute the effect of each variable on diffusion speed. For comparison, we present the average value of the estimates in Table 1 (in terms of their effect on adoption probabilityy, not speed) at the bottom of Table 2.16 We estimate the adoption model both with and without controls for the presence of particular technologies in 1991. We also compute averages across the four industries as well as estimating pooled models with industry controls. There are minor discrepancies between the averaged and pooled estimates and the presence of technology controls has little effect except for the employment coefficient.
These results indicate that profit, expressed as a fi-action of total revenue, has a statistically significant impact on adoption. Average profit is around 570 of revenues. A ten percent increase would raise it by 0.570. Based on a central coefficient estimate of about 1.5, this would raise the likelihood of adoption by about 0.75Y0. Using a high coefficient estimate of 3.0, the effect would be a 1.5% rise in the likelihood of adoption.
Although a doubling of profit could raise adoption by 15!Z0, from a policy standpoint-'bWhile we might expect these estimates to be similar, they are subject to considerable variation based on the variation already observed in Table 1 . In particular, it is unclear how the different models end up "weighting" the wide-ranging effects reflected in the estimates for individual technologies and sectors.
where a tax rebate or investment incentives might raise profit by suggest a rather small, though statistically significant, effect.
O%-these results
Prices have a statistically significant effect in the model without technology controls, but fade in the model with them. Using a central coefilcient estimate of around 0.05 and a ten percent rise in average energy prices-from $5.50/BtU to $6.00, or $0.50-we would expect a 2.5% rise in adoption. A high end coefficient estimate of 0.10 would indicate a 590 rise in the adoption rate. Compared to the profit effect, these are several times larger. But could they make a difference in terms of aggregate energy efficiency growth?
Consider that the average adoption rate in the sample is 50%. Therefore, a 5% increase in the adoption rate reflects a 10% increase in the actual number of plants adopting new technologies; e.g., 50 plants adopted before, 55 adopt now-a 109i0rise.
Based on our model, the adoption rate is proportional to growth in energy efficiency:
from Equation (9) A 1 = 6. P(adoption) where AZ is the aggregate growth in energy efficiency and 6 is the change in percent change in energy efilciency per adoption. Given the proportional relation, a 10% rise in adoptions raises the growth rate by 10%. Based on our assumptions, this increased growth rate will remain in effect so long as the price increase remains rate to persist.
in effect. Therefore, we would expect this 10% increase in the growth Although a 10% increase in energy efficiency growth is significant, it does not suggest a panacea for environmental problems. Based on a historical growth rate of about 1% per year, 17this would translate into an additional one-tenth of one percent of growth-an increase to 1.1Yoper year. Over fifty years, a 1910 growth rate would reduce energy usage by 39%. A 1.1Yogrowth rate would reduce energy use by 43%. With energy prices 10'%o higher than the baseline, total energy costs would still be higher relative to the baseline with no price increase, even after fifty years.
The While problematic in estimating the overall adoption rate, this does not introduce an obvious bias in the estimated effect on energy efficiency growth. In particular, we estimate the effect of various independent variables on the probabilityy of adoption within the pool of adoptions we can measure. Although we miss the effect on technologies beyond the four in this study, there is no reason to believe that the effect on those technologies would be different than the effect on the ones we do observe. That is, suppose we find a ten percent price increase raises the adoption rate from 50 to 55 out of 100 possible adoptions. With a larger pool of 1000 possible adoptions-larger both in terms of plants and technologies-our best guess is that there would be a corresponding increase from 500 to 550 adoptions. Thus we find no reason to imagine it should be higher or lower. Of course, to the extent that the technologies and sectors we consider are qualitatively different than the broader population, this assumption may fail.
18We have additional information about roughly a dozen industry-specific technologies which we have not used. Our conclusion is that many variables influence the adoption of new technologies.
Along with plant size (which is not typically manipulable by public policy), energy prices and profitability are both observed to raise the rate of energy-saving technology adoption.
This has important implications for the design of regulatory policies: raising the price of energy could lead to a short-run decline in energy-saving investments if f~m financial health is adversely affected.
We also find the magnitude of these effects on adoption is potentially large:
using the most generous possible estimates, a ten percent rise in energy prices could raise the adoption rate by ten percent. However, adoption of new technologies currently improves energy efficiency by only 1Yoper year. Raising that growth rate by 10%--to 1.1%--makes little difference even after fifty years. Therefore a significant improvement in the rate of adoption has little consequence for actual energy use for many years.
While this research casts doubt on the idea that technology offers the promise of low cost, pollution free production in the future, it does not completely reject the idea.
This research has focused on incremental technologies that do not fundamentally change the way plants operate. These were referred to as Type B in the literature. Although these results suggest that public policy is unlikely to generate significant improvements based on incremental technology adoption, it is entirely possible that larger, Type A innovations could be encouraged along with the incremental technologies. Perhaps the gains fi-om larger, discrete improvements in technology could, in fact, alter the trade-off between high cost environmental protection and the risk of significant environmental damage.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Databases
The data used in this paper are drawn from several plant-level data sets and a fwm-level developed by the U.S. Census Bureau:
. The Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). This is a pooled, cross-section, time seriescomprised of the establishmentresponsesto the AnnualSurveyof Manufacture (ASM) and the quinquennialCensusof Manufactures(CM) for over 50,000 establishmentsin each year. The LRD containsinformationon cost, outputsand inputsat theplantlevel. Detailedquantityand expenditureinformationfor energy consumptionare only availableup to 1981.
. The Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS). Collected by the Departmentof Energyevery threeyearsbeginning 1985, MECS contains detailed fuel consumption and expenditure data by establishment.
. Quarterly Financial Report (QFR). This dataset, collected by the U.S. Census Bureau,includesincome andretainedearnings,balance sheets,andrelatedfinancial and operatingratios for the domestic operationsof all manufacturingcorporations with assetsover $250,000, and corporationsin the miningand tradeareaswith assets over $50 million. These include almost 172,000 corporations with estimated assets of over $4.6 trillion.
A.2 Variable description
Variables used in this study are constructed as follows:
Adoption variables.
We define two types of adoption variables on the left hand side of the model. The first one, for any specific general technology, is defined as 1 if no adoption in the year 91 but adopt the technology in year 94; defined as O if no adoption in both 91 and 94. The second type of adoption variable is defined as 1 if there is an adoption in any of the four technologies; defined as O if there is no adoption in any of the four technologies.
Plant variables.
. states energy prices: state energy prices of91;
. . log errzploymenti logarithm of total employment of year 91.
Firm variables. These variablesare five quarteraveragebetween the second quarterof 90 and91. For those observationswith some quarterdatamissing, we use whatevernumberof quartersavailableto average. q workingcapital: financial capital, defined as excess of current assets over total current liabilities, subtracts short-term debt including installments on long term debt and scaled by total assets;
. after-tax profit: Income (or loss) from operations/net sales.
Industrial dummy variables. The 4-digit industries studied are pulp and paper (SIC 2621), plastic (SIC 2821), petroleum refining (SIC 291 1) and steel (SIC 3312) . Using the steel industry as a reference, we created dummy variables for the other three industries.
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A.3 Technology description
Computerized climate controls allow the plant to reduce its energy bill by more efllciently control of heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems. Computerized process controls, in contrast, lead to indirect energy-savings by improving quality and reducing waste. In the plastics industry, for example, computers are used to quickly recognize and remedy aberrations in the cooling conditions surrounding the raw plastic, reducing the amount of plastic that must be scrapped.
Waste heat recovery reduces energy use by using otherwise wasted heat to replace raw energy use. In oil refining, for example, distilled oil is piped past incoming crude oil in order to preheat it, reducing the heat required for distillation. In steel, heat exchangers on smoke stacks are similarly used to channel steam back into the smelting process.
Adjustable speed motors offer direct energy savings by eliminating the excess power provided by fixed-speed motors as needs fluctuate during production. Without this technology, this excess power is dissipated through friction or diverted to empty applications.
